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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GRACO FISHING AND RENTAL 
TOOLS, INC. and I. G. 
SPECIALTY MACHINE SHOP, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
IRONWOOD EXPLORATION, INC., 
R. D. POINDEXTER, HORIZON 
OIL & GAS COMPANY, WILLIAM 
H. WALTON and ARDEN A. ANDERSON, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 870170 
Priority Schedule No. 14b 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties have stipulated to the facts and have 
submitted an Agreed Statement of Record on Appeal which has 
been approved by the District Court. Graco accepts the 
Statement of Facts contained in Ironwood's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah and 
§78-2-2 (i) of Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the former mechanics' lien statutes 
(§38-1-1 et seq. U.C.A. (1953 as amended)) entitle Graco to 
recover from the lessee of an oil well location charges 
incurred incident to rental of equipment, sale of equipment 
not consumed on the project, transportation charges, or 
charges for repair of rented equipment, 
2. Whether the attorneyfs fee provisions of the 
mechanics lien statute, §38-1-18, required Graco to 
differentiate between the time spent on its lien theory and 
the time spent on its quantum meruit and contractor bond 
theories, all of which are separate, cumulative theories of 
recovery covering the same factual claim. 
3. Does the contractors bond statute, §14-2-1 
U.C.A., apply to rental services performed on an oil well when 
the owner of the oil well fails to obtain a contractors bond 
and the subcontractor suffers a loss as a result of a lack of 
bond? 
4. Is the owner of an oil well unjustly enriched 
when it retains $10,035.32 of monies owed the general 
contractor, and fails to pay a subcontractor $10,733.07 not 
paid the subcontractor by the general contractor even though 
the subcontractor performed its obligations under the contract? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly held as a matter of law 
that the mechanics lien statute, §38-1-3 U.C.A., applied to 
the equipment and material rental charges supplied by Graco on 
the Ironwood well. The statute as written in 1983 allows for 
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the imposition of rental charges, equipment sales, 
transportation charges which are part of the rental agreement, 
and repair and inspection costs to be lienable against the 
Ironwood oil well. Ironwood1s argument that rental charges do 
not apply to oil and gas wells in an attempt to provide a 
tortured reading of the mechanics lien statute based upon the 
placement of semicolons within the statute itself. The trial 
court's ruling imposing and foreclosing the mechanics lien 
should be upheld in its entirety. 
The attorney's fee provision of the mechanics lien 
statute, U.C.A. §38-1-18, do not require Graco to 
differentiate between its separate theories of recovery in 
billing its time when each of the theories of recovery are 
closely related factually and are cumulative remedies 
available to Graco under law. To require Graco to attempt to 
differentiate between its three affirmative theories of 
recovery would present enormous ethical and practical problems 
for the attorney billing his house to different theories of 
recovery on the same facts. The trial court correctly granted 
Graco judgment on the award of attorney's fees. 
The contractors bond statute, U.C.A. §14-2-1, applies 
to the Ironwood oil well and the services provided by Graco. 
Because Ironwood failed to require Lantz to post a performance 
bond Graco is entitled to judgment against Ironwood for the 
full amount of the contract owed of $30,499.43 or, in the 
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alternative, for the remaining $10,733.07 not covered by the 
mechanics lien statute as it was for services on a separate 
well location on which no lien was filed. 
Ironwood has been unjustly enriched in the amount of 
at least $10,035.32 because Graco provided $30,499.43 worth of 
services to Lantz on Ironwood wells and Ironwood still owes 
Lantz $10,035.32 on its contract with Lantz. If Ironwood is 
allowed to keep this amount Ironwood will be unjustly enriched 
both in the amount it owes to Lantz and in the amount of 
services Graco provided that have yet to be compensated. 
Graco requests judgment against Ironwood in the amount of 
$10,035.32 as unjust enrichment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT GRACO IS 
ENTITLED TO A LIEN FOR THE SERVICES IT PROVIDED. 
A restatement of the facts indicates that the trial 
court granted judgment on Graco's mechanics lien claim in the 
amount of $19,766.36. This claim is governed by the 
provisions of §38-1-3 U.C.A. as it existed in 1983 and 1984. 
The mechanics lien statute as it was in effect in 
1983 provided: 
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons 
performing any services or furnishing or 
renting any materials or equipment used in the 
construction, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to any 
premises in any manner; all persons who shall 
do work or furnish materials for the 
prospecting, development, preservation or 
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working of any mining claim, mine, quarry, oil 
or gas well, or deposit; and licensed 
architects and engineers and artisans who have 
furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, 
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, 
surveys or superintendence, or who have 
rendered other like professional service, or 
bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the 
property or concerning which they have rendered 
service, performed labor or furnished or rented 
materials or equipment for the value of the 
service rendered, labor performed or materials 
or equipment furnished or rented by each 
respectively, whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his 
authority as agent, contractor or otherwise. 
Such liens shall attach only to such interest 
as the owner may have in the property, but the 
interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or 
deposit, whether working under bond or 
otherwise, shall for the purposes of this 
chapter include products mined and excavated 
while the same remain upon the premises 
included within the lease. 
In construing the meaning of any statute, the Court 
should give a plain reading to the act in question, and in the 
case of ambiguity, should give primary effect to the intent of 
the Legislature. Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 692 
P.2d 755 (Utah 1982). As the Court of Appeals stated in State 
v. Jones, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 60: 
One of the fundamental rules of statutory 
construction is that the statute should be 
looked at as a whole and in light of the 
general purpose it was intended to serve; and 
should be so interpreted and applied as to 
accomplish that objective. In order to give 
the statute the implementation which will 
fulfill its purpose, reason and intention 
sometimes prevail over technically applied 
literalness. State v. Jones, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 
60, 62 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Andrus v. 
Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404 P.2d 972, 972 
(1965)). 
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Moreover, because mechanics lien statutes are 
remedial in nature, the Act should be liberally construed in 
favor of the lien claimant. Calder Bros, v, Anderson, 652 
P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). With these general tenants of 
statutory construction in mind, the mechanics lien statute 
will be analyzed in relation to rental charges, equipment 
sales, transportation charges, and repairs as they apply. 
1. Rental Charges. 
Prior to 1981 the mechanics lien statute failed to 
provide a lien for rental charges. In 1981 the Legislature, 
through Ch. 170 1981 Utah Laws amended U.C.A. §38-1-3, to 
allow those renting materials or equipment the benefit of the 
mechanics lien statutes. The relevant part of §38-1-3 as 
amended in 1981 is one long sentence divided into sections by 
semicolons. The defendants have numbered the sections divided 
in to semicolons and are claiming that the rental provisions 
only apply to the first and third sections of the Act. The 
second section dealing with "a person who shall do work or 
furnish materials for prospecting, development, preservation 
or working on any mining claim, mine quarry or oil or gas well 
or deposit; . . ." according to Ironwood does not apply to 
rental charges because the Legislature did not specifically 
amend this second section to state "renting" materials. This 
argument leads to the absurd conclusion that this second 
section then is a separate sentence of the Act which stands by 
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itself. A reading of the above section clearly indicates that 
this "sectionf,must be read in conjunction with some other part 
of the Act in order to be a sentence at all. A proper reading 
of the section is: 
All persons who shall do work or furnish 
materials for the prospecting, development, 
preservation or working of any . . . oil and 
gas well . . . shall have a lien upon the 
property upon or concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor or furnished 
or rented materials, or equipment for the value 
of the service rendered, labor performed or 
materials or equipment furnished or rented by 
each respectively . . . (emphasis added) 
Thus under the plain meaning of the amended Act, and 
the only rational reading of the Act as a whole, Graco is 
entitled to a lien for the rental charges on the oil and gas 
well subject to this action. 
Assuming arguendo there is an ambiguity as to the 
effect of the amendment, the Court may examine the title to 
the act for guidance as to the intent of the Legislature. 
Sutherland Statutory Construction §22.29, Vol. 1A p. 263 (1985 
Revision. The title of the 1981 Amendment states: 
An Act Relating to Liens; Providing Protection 
for Persons Who Rent Equipment or Materials 
Under the Mechanics1 Lien Statute. 
The Legislature intended to amend the entire Act not just the 
first and third sections as alleged by Ironwood. As such the 
rental charges were properly foreclosed under the mechanics 
lien statute. 
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2. Equipment Sales, 
As the facts indicate, the invoice also charges 
$5,919.14 for equipment furnished as part of the overall 
rental agreement. Defendants cite Stanton v. Transporation 
Company v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (1959) for the 
proposition that, for material to be lienable, the material 
must be consumed in its use, Stanton at 341 P.2d 211. 
The quote in Stanton however dealt with the claimants 
attempt to obtain a lien for such items as "wrenches, 
screwdrivers, and other tools, parts, wire brooms and supplies 
sold to the (driller) by (claimant) for which the former did 
not pay." Id. Stanton 9 Utah 2d at 190. 
In the case at hand there is nothing in the record as 
to what happened to the drill pipe or gaskets. Ironwood 
states that the bits were presumably removed upon completion 
of the project. Because, however, this factual allegation is 
unsupported in the record and was not challenged at the trial 
court level by affidavit, the factual determination that the 
drill pipe and gaskets were part of the lien should not be 
disturbed on appeal. Even if Stanton prohibits the plaintiff 
from using the lien laws to recover the cost of equipment 
sold, the Legislature amended §38-1-3 U.C.A. in 1981 to allow 
a lien for "equipment furnished." The amendment protects 
those providing equipment under a rental agreement because the 
pipe and gaskets are equipment. Under the former law, these 
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items had to fall under the definition of materials prior to 
the amended Act. In 1981 the Legislature broadened the 
definition of what is lienable to include equipment. As such, 
the 1981 amendment renders some of the language in Stanton 
obsolete. The equipment sales are so directly intertwined to 
the rental agreement that they are lienable under U.C.A. 
§38-1-3. 
3. Transportation Charges. 
The Graco lien included $2712.14 in transportation 
charges. The charges in question were necessary to transport 
the rental equipment to and from the site. Ironwood once 
again cites Stanton for the proposition that transportation 
charges are not lienable. 
This argument ignores the post-Stanton plain language 
of the 1981 amendment that allows a lien for rental equipment 
charges. The transportation charges are part and parcel of 
the rental agreement and are a major cost of doing business in 
the rental market. The transportation charges on rentals are 
different from that on sales because the equipment rental 
involved in renting services also includes equipment 
servicing, repairs and transportation, all of which are rental 
charges. The Legislature broadened the definition of rental 
equipment liens to expressly protect subcontractors providing 
these services. As such, §38-1-3 U.C.A., as was in effect in 
1983, applied to transportation charges when they are incurred 
as part of the rental services performed and Stanton is 
inapplicable in this context. 
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4. Repair charges. 
Ironwood disputes the $1096.00 charges for repairs to 
and inspection of the rental equipment. Again Ironwood cites 
Stanton to support the proposition that such charges are not 
proper subjects of the lien. 
These charges are once again part of the overall 
rental services which are lienable pursuant to the 1981 
amendment to the mechanics lien statute. Since Graco is 
obligated to keep its rental equipment in good repair, 
inspection and repair expenses are part of the necessary 
expenses lienable pursuant to the 1981 amendments absent 
summary judgment affidavits to the contrary. Graco's charges 
for inspection and repair are its responsibilities under its 
contract and are lienable pursuant to §38-1-3 U.C.A. as 
amended. 
POINT II 
GRACO IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES BECAUSE IT 
PREVAILED IN ITS AFFIRMATIVE CAUSE OF ACTION AND GRACO NEED 
NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TIME SPENT SEPARATE BUT CLOSELY 
INTERRELATED THEORIES OF RECOVERY. 
In the trial court action Graco prevailed in its lien 
claimed and filed affidavits claiming attorneys1 fees of 
$3798.75, pursuant to U.C.A. §38-1-18, which provides: 
In
 any action brought to enforce any lien under 
this chapter the successful party shall be 
entitled to recover a reasonable attorneyfs 
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be 
taxed as costs in the action. (Emphasis added) 
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This section provides for an award of attorney's fees 
whenever a party prevails on a lien foreclosure. See Petty 
Investment Co. v. Miller, 576 P.2d 883 (Utah 1978). 
Ironwood claims however that Graco must distinguish 
between time spent on the lien foreclosure and time spent on 
Graco1s other two theories. In support thereof, Ironwood 
cites Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978); Utah Farm 
Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981); 
Stubbs v. Hemert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977); Imperial-Yuma 
Production v. Hunter, 609 P. 2d 1329 (Utah 1980); and FMA 
Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1975). 
None of the above cases support the proposition that 
Graco must distinguish between attorney's fees spent on the 
lien foreclosure and attorney's fees spent on the contractors 
bond statute and quantum meruit theories. Nelson v. Newman; 
Utah Farm Credit Association v. Cox; Stubbs v. Hemert; and 
Imperial-Yuma Production v. Hunter all hold that a party must 
separate time spent on successfully prosecuting an action 
where attorney's fees are available from time spent defending 
a counterclaim. See Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d at 604; Utah 
Farm Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d at 66; Stubbs v. 
Hemert, 567 P.2d at 171; and Imperial-Yuma Production v. 
Hunter, 609 P.2d at 1331. Moreover, FMA Financial Corp., 
supra, held that there must be evidence of the time spent on 
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the case. A flat rate without anything further does not meet 
the plaintiffs burden of proof. FMA Financial Corp. v. Build, 
Inc., 17 Utah 2d at 85-86. 
In the case at hand Graco pursued the same cause of 
action under three different theories of relief. Graco 
incurred no attorney's fees defending a counterclaim and 
submitted a detailed affidavit regarding hours spent on the 
clients case. 
This Court recognizes that the remedies provided 
under the Mechanics' Lien Act are cumulative and do not 
diminish in any way a claimants rights to enforce the 
obligation of contracts or any other remedy the claimant may 
have. Harris-Dudley Plbg. v. Prof. United World Travel, 592 
P.2d 586/ 588 (Utah 1979). Because Graco's remedies are 
cumulative, the cases cited by Ironwood regarding 
counterclaims are inapplicable to this case. 
Moreover, to require Graco to differentiate between 
time spent on separate but closely interrelated theories for 
relief would lead to billing difficulties, and an unrealistic, 
arbitrary division of time. For example, factual 
investigation mostly likely would apply to all three theories 
for relief. If the fact investigation benefited all three 
theories, billing would be difficult. 
In this situation, an attorney must either bill the 
investigative time equally in thirds to each theory thereby 
unnecessarily benefiting the defendant or must unrealistically 
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bill all time but essential legal research on alternative 
theories to the theory providing for an award of attorneys 
fees, which of course would most benefit the client. Either 
scenario provides an ethically difficult decision. 
The more workable alternative is for the Court to 
award reasonable attorney's fees when a party prevails under 
the lien statute regardless of other theories the party 
pleaded. The fees cannot be claimed for defense of the 
counterclaim and what is a reasonable attorney's fee has 
always been a function of the trial court, and should remain 
so without imposing unrealistic restrictions on attorney 
billing practices. 
POINT III 
THE CONTRACTORS BOND STATUTE, U.C.A. §14-2-1 ET SEQ. , 
APPLIES TO IRONWOOD'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN A CONTRACTORS BOND 
FROM LANTZ. 
As the facts indicate, defendant Ironwood failed to 
require a contractors bond from Lantz. (F.5) The contractors 
bond statute in force during the time period relevant to this 
case states: 
The owner of any interest in land entering into 
a contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the 
construction, addition to, alteration, or 
repair of any building, structure, or 
improvement upon land shall, before any such 
work is commenced, obtain from the contractor a 
bond in a sum equal to the contract price, with 
good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for 
the faithful performance of the contract and 
prompt payment for materials ,furnished and 
labor performed under the contract. This bond 
runs to the owner and to all other persons as 
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their interest may appear. Any person who has 
furnished any materials or performed labor for 
or upon any such building, structure, or 
improvement, for which payment has not been 
made, has a direct right of action against the 
sureties upon such bond for the reasonable 
value of the rented materials or eqipment 
furnished, for the reasonable value of the 
materials furnished, or for labor performed, 
not exceeding the prices agreed upon. This 
right of action accrues 40 days after the 
completion, abandonment, or default in the 
performance of the work provided for in the 
contract. 
This bond shall be exhibited to any person 
interested, upon request. 
The issue in this case is whether the contractors 
bond statute applies to the rental services provided by Graco 
but not paid for by either Lantz or Ironwood. 
The plain language of the Act could lend support to 
either party on this issue. Although somewhat ambiguous, a 
careful reading of the Act, its legislative purposes and 
subsequent case law, support the argument that it applies to 
rental services supplied by a subcontractor on an oil well. 
The Act applies to "the owner of any interest in land 
entering ito a contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the 
construction, addition to, alteration, or repair of any . . . 
structure, or improvement upon land . . .". Ironwood is 
clearly an owner of an interest in land involving a contract 
for improvement upon the land. Ironwood owns a leasehold 
interests in oil wells. (F.l) The contract involved an 
improvement or structure upon the land, to-wit: oil wells. 
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Environmental concerns aside, there can be little question 
that an oil well is a structure or an improvement upon the 
land. 
Moreover, Graco constitutes a party who has 
"furnished any materials or performed labor for or upon such 
building, structure or improvement for which payment has not 
been made." As Exhibit D (Facts) indicates Graco provided 
rental equipment and transportation charges in the amount of 
$10,035.32. Although the statute does not expressly provide 
for recovery of rental charges, it does not exclude them 
either. Indeed the Utah Legislature clarified its intent when 
it amended §14-2-1 U.C.A. to provide for "equipment and 
materials rented." 1985 Utah Law C. 219 §1. 
Moreover, the court often refers to the mechanics 
lien statutes in construing the meaning of the contractors 
bond statute. King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 
Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962). As the court stated in King 
Bros. ; 
The mechanics lien statutes were designed to 
prevent the land owner from taking the benefit 
of improvements placed on his property without 
paying for the labor and materials that went 
into it. . . . Because of the common purpose 
of the lien and contractors bond statutes, and 
their practically identical language, 
adjudications as to what is lienable under the 
former are helpful in determining the proper 
application of the latter. j^ d. 13 Utah 2d at 
341. 
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In this case §14-2-1 U.C.A. should be construed in 
light of §38-1-3 U.C.A. which provides for a lien for 
equipment and material rented to an oil well as discussed 
previously in this brief. In fact/ had Ironwood obtained a 
contractors bond/ this litigation would not have been 
necessary. Graco is thus entitled to judgment against 
Ironwood for the additional $10/733.07 under U.C.A. §14-2-2 
because Ironwood failed to obtain the bond required under 
U.C.A. §14-2-1. Alternatively, in the event Graco's judgment 
on the lien claim is reversed by this Court/ Graco 
respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment against 
Ironwood for the full $30/499.43 owed by Lantz. 
POINT IV 
IRONWOOD HAS BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$10/345.41. 
Graco performed $30/499.43 worth of work on 
Ironwood's well. (F.3) This amount/ $10/733.07/ remains owed 
to Graco that is not covered by the mechanics lien laws. 
(F.4) Ironwood has not paid Graco any amount due on Graco 
invoices but has paid Lantz or its creditors all but 
$10/345.41 of the amount due under the contract between 
Ironwood and Lantz. (F.7) 
The crux plaintiff Graco's argument is that Ironwood 
has been enriched by Gracofs work in the amount of $10/733.49 
and has unjustly retained $10/035.00 of the money owed by 
Lantz to Graco. 
-16-
If the trial court's dismissal of Graco's claim for 
unjust enrichment is not reversed/ Ironwood will be unjustly 
enriched in the amount of $20,768.00. Graco respectfully 
requests judgment in the amount of $10/035.00 so that Graco 
can be almost fully compensated and Ironwood will not be 
unjustly enriched. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that for the reasons 
discussed herein the judgment of the District Court should be 
affirmed regarding the judgment on Graco's lien foreclosure 
and attorneys' fee award. The judgment of the District Court 
on Graco's cause of action under the contractors bond statute 
and for unjust enrichment should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of August/ 1987. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
Attorneys for Respondent 
HAMY HJSOUVALL ^ 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed/ postage prepaid/ 
four true and correct copies of the Brief of Respondents to F. 
Alan Fletcher, 1850 Beneficial Life Tower, Salt Lake Cityf 
Utah 84111 on the 27th day of August/ 1987. 
£ ^ 
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A r t VI I I , § 3 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
either en banc or in divisions. The court shall not declare any law unconstitu-
tional under this constitution or the Constitution of the United States, except 
on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the supreme court. If a justice 
of the supreme court is disqualified or otherwise unable to participate in a 
cause before the court, the chief justice, or in the event the chief justice is 
disqualified or unable to participate, the remaining justices, shall call an 
active judge from an appellate court or the district court to participate in the 
cause. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — See the 
Compiler's Note following the analysis at the 
beginning of this article. See former Article 
Repeals and Reenactments. — See the 
Compiler's Note following the analysis at the 
beginning of this article. See former Art. VIII, 
ANALYSIS 
Appellate jurisdiction. 
Certified questions. 
Certiorari. 
Habeas corpus. 
Appellate jurisdiction. 
Appellate jurisdiction connotes review of the 
action of an inferior court federal courts are 
not inferior courts to the Utah supreme court 
and supreme court's answer to certified ques-
tions in a case that originated in or is to be 
adjudicated in a federal court is not an exercise 
of appellate jurisdiction within the meaning of 
this section. Holden v. N L Industries, Inc. 
(Utah 1981) 629 P.2d 428. 
Certified questions. 
Supreme court of Utah does not have juris-
diction to answer questions of state law certi-
fied to it by the federal courts in cases that are 
to be adjudicated or originate in the federal 
courts; therefore, supreme court's certification 
rule was withdrawn. Holden v. N L Industries, 
Inc. (Utah 1981) 629 P 2d 428. 
Certiorari. 
Where, due to untimeliness, a criminal con-
viction was no longer subject to review by the 
Vin, § 2 in the bound volume for the former 
provisions comparable to this section. 
§ 4 in the bound volume for the former provi-
sions comparable to this section. 
statutory remedy of appeal, and a habeas cor-
pus proceeding, which was properly before the 
supreme court on appeal, held that defendant 
had been deprived of his constitutional right to 
an appeal, and the alleged error could not have 
been corrected on appeal and the defendant 
had taken the initiative to seek an appeal be-
fore the time for appeal had passed, supreme 
court exercised its discretion to issue the com-
mon law writ of certiorari to allow defendant a 
direct review in the supreme court of the al-
leged errors in his trial. Boggess v. Morris 
(Utah 1981) 635 P.2d 39. 
Habeas corpus* 
Matters which have been or could have been 
raised on appeal cannot be brought before the 
court by habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is a 
civil matter and the findings of the trial court 
are presumed to be proper unless there is no 
substantial evidence to sustain them. Schad v. 
Turner (1972) 27 U 2d 345, 496 P.2d 263; Wil-
son v. Turner (1972) 27 U 2d 368,496 P.2d 711; 
Leggroan v. Turner (1972) 27 U 2d 403, 497 P 
2d 17; Zumbrunnen v. Turner (1972) 27 U 2d 
428, 497 P.2d 34. 
Law Reviews Judicial Socialization: An 
Empirical Study, 11J. Contemp. L. 423 (1985). 
Sec* 3. [Jurisdiction of supreme court.] 
The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United 
States. The supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other 
matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs 
and orders necessary for the exercise of the supreme court's jurisdiction or the 
complete determination of any cause. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER PROVISIONS 
60 
78-2-1.5 JUDICIAL CODE 
Membership on state law library board, Qualifications of justices, Utah Const., Art. 
§ 37-1-1. Vin, Sec. 7. 
Proceedings unaffected by vacancy, Retirement, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 15; 
§ 78-7-21. § 49-7a-l et seq., §§ 78-7-29, 78-7-30. 
Salary, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 14. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts Key Numbers. — Courts *=» 101, 248; 
§§ 67, 68. Judges «=» 1, 7 to 12. 
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 465; 48A C.J.S. 
Judges §§ 3, 7, 8, 21 to 25, 85. 
78-2-1.5. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch. justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182, 
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court § 4. 
78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch. 
134, § 1; 1981, ch. 156, § 1), relating to sala-
ries of justices, was repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 
267, § 2, effective July 1, 1982. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective until Janu-
ary 1, 1988]. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
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SUPREME COURT 78-2-2 
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters: 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective January 1, 
1988]. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters: 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
7 
PRIVATE CONTRACTS 14-2-1 
History: L. 1983. ch. 61, § 3. 
14-1-16. Attorney's fees, 
The prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, § 4. 
14-1-17. Exemption of entities subject to Procurement 
Code. 
This chapter shall apply only to those political entities not subject to the 
provisions of Chapter 56, Title 63. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, 5 5. 
CHAPTER 2 
PRIVATE CONTRACTS 
Section Section 
14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and mate- 14-2-3. Action on bond to protect mechanics 
rialmen. an£i materialmen — Attorney's 
14-2-2. Failure to require bond — Direct lia- , .
 rt . „ ^ ' », _. 
bility - Limitation of action* 14"2"4- Exceptions - Mortgagees, benefice-
ies, trustees. 
14-2-L Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. 
The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, involving $2,000 
or more, for the construction, addition to, alteration, or repair of any building, 
structure, or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is com-
menced, obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract 
price, with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful perfor-
mance of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished, equipment 
and materials rented, and labor performed under the contract. This bond runs 
to the owner and to all other persons as their interest may appear. Any person 
who has furnished or rented any equipment or materials, or performed labor 
for or upon any such building, structure, or improvement, for which payment 
has not been made, has a direct right of action against the sureties upon such 
bond for the reasonable value of the rented materials or equipment furnished, 
for the reasonable value of the materials furnished, or for labor performed, not 
exceeding the prices agreed upon. This right of action accrues 40 days after 
the completion, abandonment, or default in the performance of the work pro-
vided for in the contract. 
This bond shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon request. 
History: L. 1915, ch. 91, § H to 3; C.L. ment inserted "equipment and materials 
1917, 5§ 3759 to 3761; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, rented," after "material furnished" near the 
17-2-1; L. 1977, ch. 56, § 3; 1985, ch. 219, § 1. end of the first sentence of the first paragraph 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- of the section; divided the second sentence into 
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14-2-2 CONTRACTOR BONDS 
expressly required the contractor to pay for all Terms of bond. 
labor and materials. De Luxe Glass Co. v. Mar- Where the condition of the bond is that the 
tin, 116 Utah 144, 208 P.2d 1127 (1949), distin- surety will indemnify the owner if the contrac-
guished, 3 Utah 2d 150, 280 P.2d 448 (1955). tor fails to pay for material and labor, it is not 
Where owners of tract of land upon which a mc^ a bond contemplated by this section so as 
franchised restaurant was built accepted per- to allow a direct action by the materialman 
formance bond from the contractor, the obliga- against the surety, as it does not promise that 
tion of which ran only to them and not to "all &« contractor will pay for the material and 
other persons as their interest may appear," labor- Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Phoenix 
they were liable for payment of judgment for J n J m - C<>" 3 U t a h 2d 150, 280 P.2d 448 
materials delivered, even though the contrac- viyoo). 
tor had been hired by the restaurant chain and Unlicensed subcontractor. 
owners had no privity of contract with him, The fact that a subcontractor is unlicensed 
since they had dealt directly with the contrac- will not bar his right to sue on a bond or di-
tor and had supervised payment of subcontrac- rectly against the owner who fails to require a 
tore. Bennett v. Downard, 533 P.2d 1348 (Utah bond. Whipple v. Fuller, 5 Utah 2d 211, 299 
1975). P.2d 837 (1956). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors* tect or building contractor of express provision 
Bonds § 1 et seq. in private building contract limiting the cost of 
C.J.S. — 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 256. the building, 20 A.L.R.3d 778. 
A.L.R. — Effect on compensation of archi- Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens *=» 313. 
14-2-2. Failure to require bond Direct liability — Limi-
tation of actions. 
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain 
such good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall 
be personally liable to all persons who have furnished materials or performed 
labor under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished 
or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed 
upon. Actions to recover on such liability shall be commenced within one year 
from the last date the last materials were furnished or the labor performed. 
History: L. 1915, ch. 91, §5 4, 5; C.L. 1917, 
§§ 3762, 3763; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,17-2-2; L. 
1965, ch. 24, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Application of statute of limitations. 
Construction of terms of bond. 
Duty to exact bond. 
Failure of builder to require bond. 
Installment payments by debtor-contractor. 
Mortgagee's liability for prepayment of general contractor. 
Prejudgment interest. 
Substantial performance. 
Sufficiency of bond. 
Supplier as materialman. 
Unlicensed subcontractor. 
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MECHANICS' LIENS 38-1-3 
applicable. Roberts v. Hansen, 25 U. (2d) 
190, 479 P. 2d 345. 
Time for filing lien. 
Materialman who supplies homeowner 
is original contractor within meaning of 
statute and has eighty rather than sixty 
days within which to . file mechanic's lien 
against homeowner's transferee. Smith 
Brothers Lbr. Co. v. Johnson, 19 U. (2d) 
107, 42G P. 2d 811. 
History: R. S. 1898 & O. L. 1907, 
§§ 1372, 1381, 1382, 1397; L. 1911, en. 27, 
§12; 0. L. 1917, §§286, 3722, 3731, 3732, 
3747; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-3; L. 1973, 
ch. 73, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1973 amendment substituted "any 
services or * * # in any manner" near the 
beginning of the first sentence for "labor 
upon, or furnishing materials to be used 
in, the construction or alteration of, or 
addition to, or repair of, any building, 
structure or improvement upon land; aU 
foundry men and boilermakers; all persons 
performing labor or furnishing materials 
for the construction, repairing or carrying 
on of any mill, manufactory or hoisting 
works." 
Cross-Re ference. 
Bond to protect mechanics and material-
men under private contracts, 14-2-1. 
Construction and application. 
The purpose of the lien statutes is to 
Collateral References. 
Mechanics' Liens^^SG. 
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens §§ 90, 97. 
53 Am. Jur. 2d 512, Mechanics' Liens 
§ i . 
Who is a "contractor" within provisions 
of lien law which limit liens for material 
or labor furnished to contractor to amount 
earned but unpaid on contract, or give 
such liens by subrogation, 83 A L. R. 1152. 
protect those who have added directly to 
the value of property by performing labor 
or furnishing materials upon it. Stanton 
Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 U. (2d) 184, 
341 P. 2d 207, explained in 23 U. (2d) 
395, 4C4 P. 2d 387. 
This statute contemplates that the mate-
rial to be lienable must be consumed in its 
use on the property. Stanton Transporta-
tion Co. v. Davis, 9 U. (2d) 184, 341 P. 
2d 207, explained in 23 U. (2d) 395, 464 
P. 2d 387. 
Where several lien claimants are unable 
to segregate and fix the value of materials 
which went into various properties, it is 
proper to apply an equitable apportion-
ment rule which would charge each lot 
with an equal share of the totals claimed 
by the several materialmen; and in apply-
ing this rule it should be made to appear 
that there is no available means of definite 
proof as to just what material went into 
which unit of property, that there is suf-
ficient proof that some material actually 
went into structures, and that the land is 
sufficiently identified and described in the 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien—What may be attached—Lien on ores 
mined.—Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing any serv-
ices or furnishing any materials used in the construction, alteration, or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any prem-
ises in any manner; all persons who shall do work or furnish materials 
for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining 
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed architects 
and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, 
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or 
who have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, 
shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor or furnished materials, for the value of 
the service rendered, labor performed or materials furnished by each re-
spectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person 
acting by his authority as agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall 
attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the property, but the 
interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit, whether working 
under bond or otherwise, shall for the purposes of this chapter include 
products mined and excavated while the same remain upon the premises 
included within the lease. 
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38-1-17 LIENS 
38-1-17. Costs—Apportionment—Costs and attorneys' fee to subcon-
tractor.—As between the owner and the contractor the court shall appor-
tion the costs according to the right of the case, but in all cases each sub-
contractor exhibiting a lien shall have his costs awarded to him, including 
the costs of preparing and recording the notice of claim of lien and such 
reasonable attorney's fee as may be incurred in preparing and recording 
said notice of claim of lien. 
His tory : E . S. 1893 & C. L. 1907, §1394; 
O. L. 1917, §3744; B. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
52-1-17; L. 1961, ch. 76, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment added provision for 
reasonable attorney's fees for preparation 
and recording of notice of claim of lien. 
In teres t on judgment. 
In action to foreclose mechanic's lien 
His tory: B . S. 1898, § 1400; L. 1899, ch. 
58, § 1 ; 0. L. 1907, §1400; O. L. 1917, 
§3750; B. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-18; L. 
1961, ch. 76, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment deleted a provision 
fixing the minimum amount of attorneys' 
fees of not to exceed $25. 
Cross-Be ference. 
Attorneys ' fee in suit for wages, 34-
27-1. 
Denial on excessive claim. 
Where it appears on trial that contrac-
tor has substantially performed his con-
t rac t but that he attempts to overcharge 
the owner in setting the total amount due 
on a cost-plus-ten-per-cent contract, the 
court docs not abuse its discretion in re-
fusing to award the contractor attorney 
fees in suit to collect upon such contract. 
Shupe v. Mcnlove, 18 U. (2d) 130, 417 P. 2d 
246. 
Bednction by tr ial court. 
Lower court can properly reduce award 
of at torney's fees to party successful in 
foreclosing mechanic's lien by one-half of 
jury 's award since under statute award of 
jury is advisory only. Frehner v. Morton, 
18 XT. (2d) 422, 424 P . 2d 446. 
Successful par ty . 
Award of attorney's fees is available to 
and to recover for services rendered un-
der contract of employment, it is not error 
to allow interest on sum awarded. Sand-
berg v. Victor Gold & Silver Mining Co., 
24 U. 1, 66 P . 360. 
Collateral References. 
Mechanics' Liens<§=>310(l). 
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 350. 
53 Am. Ju r . 2d 942, Mechanics' Liens 
§432. 
person defending against lien since this 
section confers that benefit not only on 
one who asserts lien but upon "the success-
ful par ty ." Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 
U. (2d) 297, 452 P. 2d 325. 
Validity of lien. 
Where claims of materialman for me-
chanics' liens are valid, he is entitled to 
a reasonable attorney's fee under this sec-
tion where penalty provided by 38-1-24 for 
alleged failure of materialman to release 
liens is sought by builder who contends 
that the lienB are invalid. Brimwood 
Homes, Inc. v. Knudsen Builders Supply 
Co., 14 U. (2d) 419, 385 P. 2d 982. 
Materialman is not entitled to attorney's 
fee in proceedings to foreclose mechanic's 
lien where the original notice of lien was 
deficient and at tempted amendment to cor-
rect deficiencies was not filed until after 
the t ime for filing had expired. Roberts 
Investment Co. v. Gibbons & Reed Con-
crete Products Co., 22 U. (2d) 105, 449 P. 
2d 116. 
Collateral Beferences. 
Mechanics' Liens<$=>310(l). 
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 353. 
53 Am. Ju r . 2d 943, Mechanics' Liens 
§433. 
Amount of compensation of attorney for 
services as to mechanic's lien in absence 
of contract or s tatute fixing amount, 56 
A. L. R. 2d 114. 
38-1-18. Attorneys' fees.—In any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed 
as costs in the action. 
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[959] MECHANICS AND OTHER LIENS Ch. 170 
When a subcontractor or any person furnishes labor or material as stated 
above at the instance and request of an original contractor, then such subcon-
tractor's or person's hen rights, as set forth herein, are extended so as to 
make the final date for the filing of a notice of intention to hold and claim a 
hen 80 days after completion of the onginal contract of the original contrac-
tor 
Approved March 24, 1981 
CHAPTER 170 
H B No 191 (Passed March 5 1981 In effect May 12, 1981 ) 
MECHANIC'S LIENS - ITEMS COVERED 
AN ACT RELATING TO LIENS, PROVIDING PROTECTION FOR PERSONS WHO RENT 
EQUIPMENT OR MATERIALS UNDER THE MECHANICS1 LIEN STATUTE. 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 38-1-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS LAST 
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 73, LAWS OF UTAH 1973 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 
73, Laws of Utah 1973, is amended to read 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien—What may be attached—Lien on ores mined. 
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing any services or fur-
nishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, altera-
tion, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any 
premises in any manner, all persons who shall do work or furnish materials 
for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining 
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit, and licensed architects and 
engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, speci-
fications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who 
have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a 
hen upon the property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, 
performed labor or furnished or rented materials^-,] or equipment for the 
value of the service rendered, labor performed or materials or equipment 
furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner 
or of any other person ^ acting by his authority as agent, contractor or other-
wise Such hens shall attach only to such interest as the owner may have in 
the property, but the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit, 
whether working under bond or otherwise, shall for the purposes of this chap-
ter include products mined and excavated while the same remain upon the 
premises included within the lease 
Approved March 27, 1981 
